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Abstract 
Property developers and investors have been at the forefront of urban regeneration in the UK 
since the 1980s. This has produced an emphasis on prime office space, luxury apartments, 
shopping centres and leisure attractions, which has been widely criticised on social equity grounds. 
There has, however, been only limited interrogation of the failure of property-led regeneration to 
deliver on the development it promises or on whether it represents good value for public money. 
Nottingham Eastside is one such example of policy and market failure, where for over a quarter 
of a century, property developers and investors have come and gone, none of four masterplans 
have been implemented, decontamination and infrastructure provision has never been completed, 
and most of the land is still vacant. By reconstructing the story of Nottingham Eastside, the paper 
argues that over-reliance on property-led regeneration can be highly inefficient, let alone 
inequitable, as a means to achieve strategic urban redevelopment. 
 
Keywords 
Property-led urban regeneration, hardcore land vacancy, urban redevelopment process  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Walk ten minutes from the busy shopping streets of central Nottingham, and you will come across 
over 10 hectares of urban wasteland. This is Nottingham Eastside, once a thriving hub of industrial 
activity, but characterised now by waste ground, rough grassland, leftover concrete foundation 
slabs, and decaying fire-damaged buildings. Significantly, much of the site has been vacant since 
the late 1980s, when former occupiers began to depart. Since then, four major masterplans have 
been published for its redevelopment. None have been implemented, although the scattering of 
small office blocks, a budget hotel and a media centre on the western edge of Eastside bears 
testimony to the modest progress made on one of those plans. 
 
The Nottingham experience is far from uncommon. Indeed, in cities across the world, there is 
growing interest in the semi-permanence of urban vacancy and in attempts to promote what might 
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initially appear as temporary uses of such ‘stalled spaces’ (see, for example, Colomb, 2017; Dixon 
et al., 2011; Foo, 2017; Henneberry, 2017; Németh and Langhorst, 2014). Within this context, the 
purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it is to explain why such a large area close to the centre one 
of England’s eight ‘core’ cities and the principal business centre of the East Midlands has remained 
largely vacant for so long, despite significant policy efforts and substantial public resources devoted 
to securing its redevelopment. Although development on the ground has been limited, the current 
condition of the land cannot be attributed to policy neglect or disinterest. Instead, the story is one 
of frustration as a series of developers and investors have come and gone, with the public sector 
left largely reacting to events, rather than taking charge of them. These events set the scene for the 
second purpose of the paper, which is to provide a reflective critique on the failings of that 
particular response to deindustrialisation and decay known as property-led urban regeneration 
(PLUR), which came to dominate policy thinking in the UK from the 1980s onwards.  
 
Following this introduction, the second section of the paper explores the concept of PLUR, 
connecting it to what is known about the critical success factors that may need to be present if 
hardcore urban vacancy is to be overcome. This highlights the important relationship between 
structure and agency in urban redevelopment, to which subsequent reference is made in evaluating 
the Nottingham experience. 
 
Against this broad context, the third section of the paper summarises the Eastside story, 
concentrating on the years between 1990 and 2016. It documents key events and turning points, 
and traces those responsible for important decisions and actions. The style in this section is 
deliberately factual, both to contain its length and to provide a clear basis for subsequent evaluation 
in the section that follows. The research method employed to build up the case study involved 
documentary analysis and interviews with key actors. Documents of particular significance 
included planning records, company records, and material published in the property press, local 
newspapers or online. Four interviews were conducted in 2014-15, one with Nottingham City 
Council, a second with Nottingham Regeneration Limited, a third with a locally-based independent 
regeneration expert whose familiarity with Eastside goes back to the mid-1990s, and the fourth 
with one of the private-sector developers involved in Eastside. The interviews were used to expand 
and cross-check material, and wherever possible achieve triangulation. The researchers also 
revisited material they had originally gathered as part of a wider study of urban redevelopment 
processes conducted in the 1990s (Adams et al., 2002), which proved particularly helpful in 
establishing the early history of Nottingham Eastside.  
 
The fourth section of the paper seeks to evaluate what happened at Eastside and, from this, to 
open up broader debate on how best to achieve such large-scale urban redevelopment. Applying 
a structure-agency approach, the section acknowledges that Eastside was never an easy site to 
redevelop and considers how different strategies deployed by different actors in their attempts to 
‘break through’ structural constraints, achieved varying results. The final section of the paper 
summarises the main findings of the research and considers its implications. While recognising the 
particularities of the Eastside story, it seeks to draw out lessons that may have broader applicability 
in helping to chart an alternative policy direction to PLUR. 
 
Property-led urban regeneration and hardcore vacancy 
 
As part of the entrepreneurial turn in urban governance, PLUR became the primarily thrust of UK 
urban policy in 1980s (Healey, 1991). Although property development had often formed part of 
previous renewal strategies (Turok, 1992), PLUR represented a significant shift in the power 
relations, products and funding of urban regeneration. Whereas in the past, the private sector was 
seen as subservient to the planning strategies of the public sector, PLUR overturned that balance 
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of power with planning strategies, at least for major redevelopment areas, coming to reflect the 
priorities of the private development industry. In some places, this was facilitated by the creation 
of urban development corporations, enterprise zones, and other measures that bypassed the 
jurisdiction of elected local planning authorities, but in others, planning authorities themselves 
enthusiastically adopted the new agenda. 
 
The immediate result of such changing power relations was fundamentally to alter regeneration 
products. Prime office space, luxury apartments, shopping centres and leisure attractions, for 
instance, began to appear in places long considered ‘off-pitch’ by most private-sector developers. 
To achieve financial return and ensure market appeal, PLUR needed to operate, at least initially, at 
a large enough scale to create entirely new locations that could be branded as quite separate from 
their poorer surroundings. This is why PLUR often focused on grandiose or flagship projects 
(Loftman and Nevin, 1995), creating high value uses in what had previously been low value areas. 
Market-making on this scale was not simply a private-sector responsibility but became a core 
component of planning strategies. Indeed, despite political rhetoric, the public sector provided 
much of the baseline funding for PLUR through land assembly, decontamination, new 
infrastructure and direct development subsidies. Those who championed PLUR argued that such 
redirection of public funding was justified by the extent of private funding it subsequently levered 
into regeneration areas. 
 
Nevertheless, PLUR was widely criticised as socially divisive (Imrie and Thomas, 1993), creating 
up-market environments intended for incomers, rather than the workplaces and decent homes 
needed by local people. Although some suggest that PLUR reached its heyday in the UK during 
the early 1990s, and was replaced by more community-based approaches to regeneration, others 
argue that its fundamental tenets became entrenched within broader regeneration policy and are 
still very much alive today (Dillon and Fanning, 2015). There has certainly been strong evidence 
that PLUR is widely practised internationally, for example in Ireland (McGuirk, 2000), across 
Europe (Carbonaro and D’Arcy, 1993), in Chile (López-Morales, (2013), and even in China (He 
and Wu, 2005). 
 
The literature around PLUR is resplendent with case studies and critiques of schemes that were 
eventually built, but there is remarkably little written on projects that failed and were never 
implemented. Property market conditions are too often taken for granted in PLUR evaluations 
(D’Arcy & Keogh, 1999), which means that studies tend to focus on the implications of PLUR for 
social equity, important as these are, but not directly on the efficiency and effectiveness of PLUR 
itself. This is where the Nottingham experience, reported in this paper, provides an important new 
contribution to the literature. As it shows, understanding the management and distribution of 
development risk between the public and private sectors is crucial in assessing whether PLUR 
represents good value for public money. 
 
It can be argued that PLUR seeks to address the embedded failure of urban property markets 
(Jones, 1996) in which “Low demand, dereliction, and risk in development costs prevented new 
construction” (Larkin and Wilcox, 2011: 3). Land that has been vacant or derelict for more than 
nine years is officially defined as having fallen into semi-permanent or ‘hardcore’ vacancy (English 
Partnerships, 2003). The significance of hardcore vacancy is twofold. First, the overall amount can 
be expected to be disproportionately weighted towards problematic sites requiring, for example, 
expensive decontamination. Second, the very fact that hardcore land has remained vacant for so 
long normally means that it has remained untouched by demand pressures from at least one 
development boom. In 2001, around 25% all vacant or derelict land in England, amounting to 
some 16,523 hectares, was estimated to be hardcore vacant (English Partnerships, 2003). By 2014, 
4 
 
unofficial estimates suggested this total had increased to 17,740 hectares, a 7% rise on the 2001 
figure (CPRE, 2014). 
 
Whether PLUR can provide an effective market response to hardcore vacancy will depend on its 
ability to generate what Dixon et al., (2011) call seven ‘critical success factors’ that enable long-
term barriers to redevelopment to be overcome. From their comparative study of 10 hardcore sites 
in Manchester in England and Osaka in Japan, they consider these to be strong local property 
markets, developers able to exploit recession by purchasing land cheaply, long-term vision capable 
of spanning market cycles, strong brands often established through flagship projects, strong 
partnerships between the public and private sectors, achieving large-scale development, and 
prioritising infrastructure. The Nottingham experience reported in this paper explores whether the 
converse of these factors helps account for continued hardcore land vacancy. 
 
The ‘critical success factors’ identified by Dixon et al., (2011) sought to link economic and property 
market change to the strategies of key stakeholders. If we wish to know whether PLUR is likely to 
resolve or perpetuate hardcore urban vacancy, it is indeed important to understand how structure 
and agency are constituted in each specific context and by what means they interact with each 
other. Applying Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, Healey and Barratt (1990) suggest that 
although actors define and pursue their strategies, interests and actions in the context of a 
structural framework, structure itself is established, re-established or replaced as the resources, 
rules and ideas by which it is constituted are deployed, acknowledged, challenged and potentially 
transformed through agency behaviour. The precise relationship between structure and agency is, 
of course, context-dependent. This makes detailed empirical investigation, such as that presented 
here, particularly important to the development of structuration theory. Moreover, the 
Nottingham experience of changing actor strategies pursued over 25 years within a dynamic and 
complex structural context, as recounted in the next section, provides a valuable opportunity to 
explore the urban redevelopment process within a specific context through the lens of structure 
and agency theory. 
 
Nottingham Eastside: A case study 
 
Nottingham Eastside is a 13.9-hectare redevelopment area, located immediately to the south-east 
of the city centre of Nottingham. By 2017, much of Eastside had lain vacant for at least 27 years, 
although some 2.8 hectares on its western edge have been redeveloped in recent decades. As 
shown on Figure 1, Eastside comprises three main parts; namely Boots Island to the north (Site 
A), Boots Warehouse in the centre (Site B) and the former railways lands to the south (Site C). 
The Eastside story is best recounted in five acts, each of which is summarised below. To facilitate 
understanding of the story, we first present a more detailed timeline in Table 1. 
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Figure 1: The three components of Eastside 
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Table 1: Nottingham Eastside – Detailed Timeline 1980-2016 
 
 Site A: Boots Island Site B: Boots 
Warehouse 
Site C: Railways Land 
1980-84  Owned for many decades by Boots  
 Boots starts to move activities out to new 
campus at Beeston in western suburbs of 
city 
 Owned for 
many decades 
by Boots (and 
remained so 
until 2005) 
 Owned for many decades by BR and previously 
occupied as goods yard, with two 19th century 
warehouses, and Grade II listed former station  
 BR reviews need of former station as parcel depot 
 Great Northern Warehouse listed Grade II by English 
Heritage (1983) but badly damaged by fire (1984) 
1985-89  Compulsory purchase threatened by NCC 
(1986) but never undertaken 
 Planning brief published by NCC (1987) 
  Enhancements to former station funded by central & 
local government (1985) 
 BRPB obtains listed building consent to repair Great 
Northern Warehouse (1986) 
 Planning brief published by NCC (1987) 
 BR ceases to use former station (1988) 
 Compulsory purchase threatened by NCC (1989) but 
never undertaken 
1990-92  Boots proposes major mixed-use scheme, 
including World Trade Centre (1990) and 
gains planning approval from NCC (1991) 
 Boots acquire two small additional plots on 
edge of site to facilitate major 
redevelopment (1991) 
 Designated as ‘flagship project’ in newly-
formed City Challenge (1991) 
 New ‘City Link’ road constructed across site 
from west to east (1991)  
  BRPB submits planning application for major mixed-use 
redevelopment (1990) 
 Former station proposed as new location of Museum of 
Transport and Industry (1990) but despite potential 
funding from NCC & ERDF, never implemented 
1993-98  NCC buys site from Boots and then 
concludes ‘back-to back’ 999-year lease to 
development partnership comprising 
  NCC buys former station from BRPB (1993) and 
subsequently acquires remainder of railway lands, 
including the two 19th century warehouses (1994). 
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Simons of Lincoln and Gulliver 
Development Property Unit Trust (1994-
95) 
 Simons secures approval of masterplan for 
Island site, involving mostly office, but 
some workshop development to east (1994) 
 Simons obtains planning permission for 
new BBC centre & two offices blocks and 
on western edge of site (1994-96) 
 Almost £6 million of public money spent 
on clearance, reclamation & 
decontamination of site (1995-97). Most of 
cost shared between City Challenge & 
ERDF, but some contributions from EP & 
NCC 
 City Challenge wound up (1997) and NRL 
established (1998) 
 Simons exit development partnership, 
leaving Gulliver DPUT as lead developer 
(1998) 
 Gulliver DPUT merged with Lionbrook 
Property Partnership (1998), managed by 
Baring, Houston and Saunders  
 Goods yard cleared of all buildings except the two 19th 
century warehouses. NCC spends £90,000 in 
contamination testing but no real decontamination work 
undertaken (1994) 
 NCC sells the two 19th century warehouses to local 
antiques dealer, Philip Murdoch (1994) 
 NCC enters into conditional 999- year lease agreement 
with Simons of Lincoln on former station and land to 
south of the two 19th century warehouses (1995). Lease 
dependent on securing planning permission and 
attracting occupiers via pre-lets 
 Simons seeks permission to convert former station to 
restaurant/leisure use and build adjoining multiplex 
cinema (1997) but withdraws application (1998) after it 
was ‘called in’ by Secretary of State and scheduled for 
public inquiry 
 Simons gains permission to convert former station into 
leisure & health club (1998) 
 Listed Great Northern Warehouse further damaged by 
fire (1988) 
 Simons seeks planning permission for car showrooms & 
drive-thru restaurant on land to south of warehouses 
(1998) but later withdraws proposal (1999) 
1999-
2002 
 Dutch bank ING acquires Baring, Houston 
and Saunders 
 NRL commission Latham Architects to 
prepare New Eastside Masterplan (2001) 
covering 56 ha to east of City Centre, 
including sites A-C 
 BBC centre, office blocks and new hotel 
constructed on western part of site 
  Conditional lease agreement with Simons cancelled 
(1999) 
 Philip Murdoch refused consent for demolition of Great 
Northern Warehouse (1999) 
 Holmes Place Health Club established at former station 
(1999) (subsequently became Virgin Active) 
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 Health Club acquired by Amex Staff Pension Trustees, 
but remainder of site apart from warehouses previously 
sold to Philip Murdoch, still owned by NCC 
 A-C Entire Eastside Side 
2003-09  Baring, Houston and Saunders renamed ING Real Estate Investment Management, and Lionbrook becomes ING Lionbrook 
(2003) 
 ECD assembles entire site, buying out ING (2003, Site A), Boots (2005, Site B), Philip Murdoch (2006, Site C - 19th century 
warehouses) & NCC (2006 Site C - land south of warehouses) plus around 10 other minor interests  
 ECD submits planning application for ‘Eastside City’ a major mixed-use redevelopment (2004). NCC resolved to grant consent in 
2005, but legal negotiations delayed final approval until 2008 
 Warehouse on Site B vacated by Boots and demolished (2005) 
 ECD sells entire site to HH (2008) 
 HH submits planning application for 7 storey office block to west of site (2008) 
2010-17  HH grants option to Tesco on part of Site A (2010) 
 HH & Tesco submit planning application for major superstore (2010) but proposal subsequently withdrawn (2011) 
 Compulsory purchase again threatened by NCC (2014) 
 HH markets entire site through Savills seeking expressions of interest (2014) 
 HH sell entire site to Conygar (2016) who then start to prepare a new masterplan for Eastside (2017) 
Abbreviations 
BR British Rail 
BRPB British Rail Property Board 
ECD Eastside & City Developments - a consortium headed by Roxylight along with Laing O’Rourke and Barclays Bank 
EP English Partnerships 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
HH Heathcote Holdings 
LLS Low Level Station 
NCC Nottingham City Council 
NRL Nottingham Regeneration Ltd 
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Act 1: Deindustrialisation, dereliction and departure (Pre-1990) 
 
By the 1980s, the pharmaceutical giant Boots had occupied A & B as its main manufacturing hub 
for almost a century, while C had been in railway use for even longer. However, during that decade, 
Boots decided gradually to decant its central Nottingham operations to a modern campus in the 
west of the city. To the south, the once-busy rail-based activities fell into decline and then disuse. 
The prospect of significant redevelopment potential on A & C (Site B remained in operational use 
as a major warehouse for Boots until around 2005) seemed inhibited only by numerous decaying 
buildings and extensive contamination left behind from decades of heavy industrial use. To 
accelerate the redevelopment process, in the late 1980s Nottingham City Council threatened to 
take compulsory purchase action against both Boots and the then nationalised British Rail. It also 
published planning briefs for A & C, setting out redevelopment options, albeit in quite generalised 
terms. The council’s prime objective was to secure new employment, through the development of 
new offices and light industry. More ambitious plans, however, were soon tabled by the 
landowners. 
 
Act 2: Piecemeal property-led redevelopment (1990-98) 
 
In early 1990, Boots announced proposals for a massive commercial redevelopment of Site A, 
including 57,000 m² of speculative offices, a ‘World Trade Centre’ of 13,500 m², an upmarket hotel 
of 10,300 m², along with luxury apartments, shops, canal marina and 1,100 parking spaces (see 
Figure 2). This was the first of four major masterplans produced for the site. At an estimated 
development cost of £150 million, it was said to offer the prospect of 2,500 new jobs for the city. 
Not to be outdone, in late 1990, British Rail then announced its own plans for comprehensive 
commercial, retail and residential development on Site C. But had such longstanding industrial 
landowners really turned into real estate developers? Looking back some 25 years later, one 
regeneration expert long associated with the area was quite dismissive of the Boots proposal, 
commenting that “This was all part of a strategy to create some hype and excitement about the 
site prior to selling it …The notion of having a World Trade Centre was a bit fanciful but it got 
lots of coverage in the press. Lots of people got excited about it and then the City probably 
overpaid for it.”  
 
While this view may well be correct, the interview conducted earlier with Boots Properties in 1997 
revealed another important motive – the desire to access funding from ‘City Challenge’, the high-
profile regeneration competition launched in 1991 by the then Environment Secretary, Michael 
Heseltine. Nottingham City Council had successfully bid for £37.5 million ‘City Challenge’ monies 
over five years to regenerate the deprived inner city neighbourhoods of St Ann’s and Sneinton, in 
which Eastside is located. But once it turned out that the council was unwilling to hand over any 
of the cash to subsidise the Boots scheme, a land sale was agreed, with the council buying Site A 
from Boots for £2 million in 1994. By this time, the Island site had been designated as a City 
Challenge ‘flagship project’ and almost £6 million of public money was allocated for clearance and 
decontamination, which subsequently took place between 1995 and 1997. Moreover, even before 
the land purchase from Boots was finalised, a well-regarded local developer, Simons of Lincoln 
(partnered by Gulliver Development Property Unit Trust) had been selected to take forward the 
development on a ‘back-to-back’ deal. This meant that shortly after the council paid out the £2 
million for the purchase from Boots, it would receive just as much, if not more, from Simons for 
a 999-year lease of the land. 
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Figure 2: Boots Masterplan (1990) 
 
 
Simons then launched its own masterplan for the Island site – the second to be produced, but one 
that was far less ambitious than the earlier Boots scheme. This proposed campus-style office 
development in central and western parts of the site, with light industrial development to the east. 
The latter was included at the insistence of the council, even though Simons thought only the 
office development was commercially viable. Again, jobs were promised – up to 2,000 on 
completion of the scheme. Yet, by the time Simons exited the development partnership in late 
1998, its achievements at Site A were limited to building an east-west link road, constructing a new 
media centre for the BBC, and securing planning permission for two nearby office blocks. This 
was modest progress, at best, in comparison with earlier hopes. 
 
To the south, the council had also bought out British Rail in 1993/94, paying around £1.6 million 
for the railway land and buildings. Initially, the council supported a community-based proposal for 
a transport museum in the former station, but then pulled out of this proposal. Instead, it again 
engaged Simons as preferred developer for the whole of C, except two former nineteenth century 
warehouses. Keen to divest itself as soon as possible of any repair responsibilities for these 
structures (one of which had been listed as a building of special architectural or historic interest in 
the 1980s), the council quickly sold them to a local antiques dealer. 
 
On the rest of site C, the agreement with Simons remained dependent on obtaining planning 
permissions and securing occupiers via pre-lets. Ironically then, Simons’ first proposal for a cinema 
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and leisure complex was withdrawn after it was ‘called in’ for a decision by the Secretary of State, 
while its second proposal for car showrooms and a ‘drive-thru’ restaurant was again withdrawn, 
this time after the council threatened to refuse it. Simons did manage to turn the former station 
and adjacent land into a health club, but after that, its agreement to take on the rest of the site 
lapsed. The council was then left holding a significant chunk of the former railway land without 
any immediate prospect of development, while subsequently seeing the adjacent listed warehouse 
it had previously sold to the antiques dealer go up in flames, with the shell soon falling into decay. 
 
By 1997, when City Challenge ended, substantial public funding had generated only limited 
piecemeal development at Eastside and certainly nothing to match the earlier ambition of the 
‘World Trade Centre’ proposed by Boots. It was time to take stock and consider what alternative 
strategy might be pursued. 
 
Act 3: Emergence of greater ambition (1999-2002) 
 
The turn of the millennium produced limited on-site change at Eastside. Gulliver Development 
Property Unit Trust, which had assumed responsibility for Site A after the exit of its partner 
Simons, was itself taken over by a series of property investment trusts, which then presided over 
the development of three ‘campus-style’ office blocks and a ‘Premier Inn’ Hotel on the western 
edge of the site. Meanwhile, on the vacant former railway lands to the south, not even the hint of 
any development was evident. But with the election of the Labour Government in 1997, the 
institutional landscape for urban regeneration and economic development in cities such as 
Nottingham changed markedly. The East Midlands Regional Development Agency was 
established (one of nine RDAs covering the whole of England) and the role of English 
Partnerships (the Government’s own urban regeneration agency) was much expanded. These two 
bodies came together with the council and private-sector interests in the city to set up Nottingham 
Regeneration Limited (NRL), as a non-for-profit urban regeneration company. NRL’s focus was 
“on physical regeneration though spreading the benefits more widely. The company commissions 
masterplan and regeneration studies and then seeks appropriate partners. They are developer of 
last resort” (URBED 2002: 33).  
 
NRL was immediately asked by the council to prioritise plans for Boots Island and its vicinity. As 
a result, it commissioned a new Eastside Masterplan (the third in our series) from a team led by 
Latham Architects. This was published in 2002. It covered both the 13.9 hectares of the Eastside 
site itself and another 42 hectares of fringe city centre neighbourhoods to the north. Although 
termed a masterplan, it was no architectural blueprint of the kind produced earlier by Boots, but 
rather an informal development framework intended “to help deliver a vibrant, sustainable, high 
density and mixed-use urban area in line with national, regional and local policy” (Latham 
Architects, 2002: 1). 
 
Turning specifically to the 13.9 hectare Eastside site, the Latham report (2002, para 7.2.7) 
concluded that office development had “faltered in market terms” and that it represented the 
“wrong product … in this location.” Extending the canal basin into the very heart of the site 
would, it was argued, create the opportunity for higher-value and higher-density commercial, and 
especially, residential development. The report recognised that as well as private-sector 
contributions, further public-sector support would be needed to deliver this vision. Since its 
publication fortuitously coincided with an improving national economy and a rapid upturn in real 
estate development, the report did not go unnoticed outside Nottingham. Very soon, London-
based property developers “came into town, promising to do wonderful things and putting money 
behind it… They commissioned a crack team and spent proper consultancy money” (Nottingham-
based regeneration expert). The fortunes of Eastside were about to experience quite radical change. 
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Act 4: Grandiose property-led visioning (2003-09) 
 
These new entrants to Nottingham were Eastside and City Developments (ECD), a joint-venture 
development company formed in June 2003 with the specific intent of promoting one of the 
biggest single developments ever to take place in Nottingham. ECD was a partnership between 
Barclays Bank, Laing O’Rourke (one of the UK largest construction companies) and a relatively 
small firm of project managers and development consultants, called Roxylight. Its public face in 
Nottingham and beyond was Nigel Brunskill, Roxylight’s Managing Director. Up to 2005, ECD 
spent what Brunskill later described as “tens of millions” “painstakingly” assembling the whole of 
the Eastside site from 15 different landowners. He described this as “the most complicated land 
assembly I have ever been involved with” (quoted in Cunningham, 2009). 
 
The main purchases were that of Site A from ING Real Estate Management (successors to Simons 
and Gullivers), Site B from Boots (which finally closed its major warehouse and last operational 
use on the site in 2005) and Site C from Nottingham City Council and the local antiques dealer 
who had previously bought the two nineteenth century warehouses from the council. What is 
remarkable about land assembly of such a scale is that it was undertaken in a relatively short 
timescale entirely by the private sector and without any threat of compulsory purchase. For the 
first time, it brought the whole of the Eastside site into single ownership, opening up the possibility 
that it could be planned and developed as a single integrated project. 
 
When ECD’s masterplan for the whole Eastside was unveiled in 2004 (the fourth in our series: see 
Figure 3), the scale of ambition for the site was quite staggering. Masterplanned by the international 
architectural practice of Hopkins Associates, the proposed 270,000m² comprehensive mixed-use 
redevelopment included 131,000m² of prime office space, 123,000m² of luxury apartments, almost 
12,000m² of shops, bars and restaurants and 4,000m² of leisure space, all centred around a major 
new public space and a new canal basin, first envisaged in the Latham Report. The estimated total 
development cost was £900 million. 
 
It took four years of detailed negotiations with the council before planning permission was 
eventually granted and accompanying legal agreements signed. However, by that stage, the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) had produced rapid downturn in investment property values, bringing the 
long development boom of the 2000s to an end. At around the same time, ECD sold its interest 
in Eastside to the specially created and somewhat mysterious Guernsey-based investment vehicle 
called Heathcote Holdings. The reason, according to Nigel Brunskill was that “A project of this 
size and geographical importance requires substantial equity investment, and the Guernsey 
structure has the ability to achieve this … Overseas investors, family funds and sovereign wealth 
funds would expect and often demand ownership through a non-UK entity” (quoted in 
Cunningham, 2009). Heathcote retained Brunskill as project manager, but the funding required to 
commence the development never materialised. 
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Figure 3: The Hopkins Masterplan (Source: Hopkins Architects and Richard Davies) 
 
 
It could be argued that, by taking four years to grant planning consent, Nottingham City Council 
ironically saved ECD and subsequently Heathcote from what might well have been financial 
disaster had their development commenced in the period immediately before the GFC. Looking 
back, those interviewed in 2014 and 2015 were firmly of the view that the Hopkins masterplan 
was just too large and ambitious for a provincial city such as Nottingham. In retrospect, the Chief 
Executive of Nottingham Regeneration Limited thought that everyone had been “seduced by 
glorious images of docklands-like development, with a massive amount of apartments centred 
around public squares and fancy fountains etc. etc. They were all very seductive.” This view was 
shared by another Nottingham-based regeneration expert who considered that even the council 
had been “swept up in the hubris of the moment” trying to re-create Kings Cross, London in 
central Nottingham. He added the proposal “was driven by a London developer who was a bit 
disconnected from the provincial world … They didn’t understand the dynamics of the (local) 
market.” In the end, Nottingham Eastside was no further forward in 2009 than it had been in 
1999. Indeed, as one interviewee poignantly suggested, the site had once again been left standing 
at the altar. 
 
Act 5: Hard reality dawns (2010-17) 
 
Despite the demise of the Hopkins masterplan, Heathcote had one last card to play. Even in the 
post-GFC recession, the main UK supermarkets continued to expand their store numbers, with 
Tesco taking prime market position. So in 2010, Heathcote linked up with Tesco to make a joint 
planning application for an 11,800m² superstore on part of Site A, which would have been one of 
the largest such developments in the UK. This time, the number of jobs promised by the 
developers was smaller than before, at only 300 to 500. Yet, it soon became clear that this proposal 
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faced fierce opposition from the council, owing to its perceived negative impact on retail activity 
in the city centre. The application was therefore withdrawn in 2011, possibly to avoid a formal 
planning refusal. Ironically, within three years, Tesco itself ran into financial difficulties and made 
a strategic decision to slim down, rather than expand its estate portfolio, casting doubt on whether 
the Nottingham store would ever have been built, even if planning permission had been granted. 
For Heathcote, the end result of this failed venture with Tesco was to undermine any support it 
may still have had from NRL and the council, making relationships, according to the NRL’s Chief 
Executive “quite confrontational” and “unpleasant” at the end. In his view, the Guernsey-based 
company was by then perceived as being “very absentee landlordish” and without any long-term 
investment interest in the city. 
 
By 2012, the council had agreed a new ‘City Deal’ with central government in which the wider 
Eastside area was designated as a new Creative Quarter for the city and support was promised for 
“the redevelopment of Nottingham’s prime Eastside Island regeneration site.” But with still no 
proposals coming forward from Heathcote, the council eventually lost patience in December 2014, 
and resolved to take control of the site itself, either through voluntary acquisition or compulsory 
purchase. Justifying this decision, Councillor Jon Collins, the Leader of Nottingham City Council 
said “We have done all we can to encourage and support the site owners to progress with the site’s 
redevelopment but after years of inaction from them, we have no confidence they have any 
intention of doing so” (quoted in Nottingham Post, 2014).  
 
Perhaps anticipating the council’s move, in October 2014, Heathcote placed the entire 13.9-hectare 
site on the market through the international property agents, Savills, seeking expressions of interest 
from potential purchasers. Two years later, it was announced that the site would be sold to 
Lavignac Securities, a small real estate investment company based in Windsor (Norman, 2016). 
Yet again, the Nottingham post talked up the likely scale of future development, which it suggested 
could “potentially provide hundreds of homes and thousands of jobs” (Robinson, 2016). In fact, 
the purchase was actually completed by Conygar PLC, a larger London-based property investment 
and development company, who paid £13.5 million to acquire the whole of Eastside in December 
2016. Although it was reported at the time that Conygar and Lavignac would work in partnership 
(Robinson, 2017), within a few months, the larger company appeared very much in the lead. 
Indeed, in its interim annual report, published in May 2017, Conygar described Eastside as “an 
exciting investment and development opportunity with the potential for a mixture of office, 
residential, leisure and student housing accommodation” and, without mentioning Lavignac, 
announced that it was “currently conducting a master planning exercise and expects to submit a 
planning application before the end of the calendar year” (Conygar, 2017: 3). For those with long 
memories, such an announcement seems strangely reminiscent of those made by Eastside and City 
Developments almost a decade and a half earlier. 
 
At the time of writing, however, Eastside remains much as it has been for the last 27 years – an 
urban wasteland (see Figure 4). That’s not to suggest it is wholly unused. Instead, it seems to 
function well as a location for informal recreation, since “People use it as a running circuit, or 
commuters who cut through from the station to Sneinton - there’s also a lot of dog walkers, 
cyclists, people who picnic there - there’s lots of people using it in lots of different ways” (Griffin, 
2013). But, despite some limited redevelopment on its western edge, none of the plans of the last 
25 years have produced any substantial transformation in how most of Eastside appears to, and is 
used by, the people of Nottingham. In the next section, we seek to discover the deeper reasons 
why it remains vacant after all these years. 
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Figure 4: Nottingham Eastside 2014 
 
Evaluation 
 
This section seeks to understand what really happened at Eastside and to evaluate why a property-
led approach failed to transform the area. The section has a twofold focus on both the differential 
impact of structure upon actors and the differential response of actors to structure. Three main 
structural elements are identified: locational and site-specific constraints, economic and property 
market cycles, and the broader policy context. All three made development difficult, although the 
impact of this varied between actors and over time. Elsewhere, PLUR has delivered major 
redevelopment in the face of challenging structural circumstances. Why then at Nottingham did 
no single actor or combination of actors succeed in breaking through the site’s inherent structural 
difficulties? 
 
Taking location as the first structural element, even though Eastside lies close to the centre of 
Nottingham, it is separated from the commercial and retail hub of the city by major arterial roads 
and is very much on the fringe of the city centre. It is generally bordered by relatively low-value 
uses, consistent with its location within a broader regeneration area. Decades of heavy industrial 
activity meant Eastside was highly contaminated and, within the site itself, deficient in modern 
roads and sewers. Ownership was fragmented at the start, and became ever more so before ECD 
eventually pieced it together. 
 
At the start of the 1990s, the council saw this as classic ‘employment generating’ land, by which it 
seems to have meant industrial workshops, with some office activities on the edge. This would 
have provided only limited financial reward for the departing industrial owners, Boots and British 
16 
 
Rail. To raise land value expectations and secure significant exit payments from the council, they 
‘reimagined’ the location as one suitable for significant PLUR. This early 1990s vision of major 
mixed-use redevelopment radically changed structural perceptions of what was achievable at 
Eastside, but it did not make actual redevelopment any easier. The up-market development 
concept created and exploited by Boots and British Rail allowed them to depart without even 
paying for the contamination they had created, while leaving other actors to grapple with the 
consequences. No-one was subsequently able to overcome the locational and site-specific 
disadvantages of Eastside, apart from at the western edge closest to the city centre. As argued 
below, to do so would have more required more effective institutional arrangements for the 
management of risk in the development process. 
 
Broader economic and property market cycles provide the second structural element which served 
to open up and close down opportunities to act. Developers who can successfully ‘read’ this 
structural element and act accordingly by starting development early in a cycle will normally be 
expected to outperform those who start late. Although Eastside saw its existing uses wind down 
in the 1980s, the site missed the development boom of that decade and emerged as a real 
redevelopment opportunity only in the midst of the recession in the early 1990s. Even by 1994, it 
was still not a fortuitous economic moment for Simons to launch its masterplan. In 1998, the 
company withdrew because, according to its development director, it felt that local market 
conditions were still “going badly by this stage.” Yet, within two years, the long development 
upturn that lasted until the onset of the GFC in 2008 had begun. Why did no-one take advantage 
of this upturn to commence major redevelopment at Eastside? 
 
Again, the answer lies in the defective institutional arrangements at Eastside. PLUR normally 
requires lengthy preparations to be made over several years. In 1998, it fell to NRL to pick up the 
pieces and chart a new direction for the site but as an urban regeneration company, rather than an 
urban development corporation, it had no control over planning policy and never gained 
ownership control of the site. Its Eastside masterplan, published in 2002, transformed the 
structural perception of the site’s potential with cleverly created visions of high-value commercial 
and residential development, but was not directly linked to any means of implementation. 
Nevertheless, it helped create an ambitious new direction that ECD’s Hopkins masterplan, 
produced in 2004, sought to exploit. By then, the development upturn of the 2000s was well 
underway. ECD’s late arrival was exacerbated by the four years it took the council to grant consent 
for the Hopkins masterplan. 
 
Whether the Hopkins masterplan would have succeeded if it had been tabled in 2000, gained early 
planning permission, and started on site in 2002 will never be known and, in many ways, is 
irrelevant. This is because PLUR, especially when deployed at such a large-scale as Eastside, creates 
very significant development risks which cannot easily be managed by individual actors operating 
alone within a single development cycle. This lessens their ability to challenge and transform 
difficult structural conditions. 
 
The broader policy context, which provides the third structural element, reinforced site-specific 
and broader economic constraints. After a decade of neoliberalism, by the 1990s local planning 
authorities were no longer expected to drive or deliver change, but merely to regulate it. The rapid 
increase in unemployment experienced during the 1980s also meant that councils were easily 
swayed by any promises made about future job creation, whether reliable or not. PLUR offered 
the chance to capture a greater share of central government funding for development projects at 
a time when mainstream budgets were under severe strain. Early experience from Canary Wharf 
in London, Salford Quays in Manchester and elsewhere had indicated the apparent potential of 
ambitious PLUR projects, making other localities keen to attract such up-market development. At 
17 
 
the same time, disempowerment and institutional fragmentation increasingly encouraged local 
authorities to share city leadership with the private sector through relatively short-term 
programmes such as City Challenge. Although Eastside benefited from almost £6 million of City 
Challenge money spent on decontamination and infrastructure, this limited subsidy seems not to 
have been able to transform the fortunes of the site radically. 
 
From a private-sector perspective, almost all the uncertainties of planning regulation remained at 
Eastside. There was much planning controversy, for example, over Simons’ various designs on 
Site A and the company eventually withdrew two major proposals for Site C after planning refusals 
seemed imminent (despite having already agreed to buy the land from the council). ECD appears 
to have underestimated the time it would take to secure planning permission for the Hopkins 
masterplan, while later on Heathcote badly misunderstood the policy context, even though it 
recognised the market potential of the supermarket boom. 
 
There is little sense that the council ever wished or even knew how to drive development forward 
at Eastside. It provided no long-term vision for the site and seemed indifferent between the cost 
minimisation strategy pursued by Simons and the value maximisation strategy favoured by ECD. 
Published planning documents offered no clear or consistent sense of what the council wanted to 
achieve but appear to have served merely as a baseline for negotiations. Indeed, the council mainly 
reacted to proposals from others, not really appreciating local market conditions or its own ability 
to shape them. Crucially, when it might have taken overall control of the site after those initial 
purchases from Boots and British Rail, the council appears to have wanted to divest itself of direct 
ownership responsibility as soon as possible. 
 
Even if its role was intended to be that of mere development facilitation, it seems not to have 
fulfilled this with any vigour, still less to have challenged and transformed the structural context. 
Apart from the scattering of development on the western edge of the site, it now has little to show 
for the £9.6 million spent on land acquisition, decontamination and infrastructure, not to mention 
all the administrative costs incurred over many years. Although its authority was never usurped by 
an urban development corporation (as happened elsewhere with other PLUR projects), its largely 
reactive role created a vacuum in local place leadership which the private sector struggled to fulfil. 
 
In summary, no single actor or combination of actors ever adopted strategies and tactics capable 
of breaking through the structural constraints at Eastside. It could be said that ECD came closest 
to this with the Hopkins masterplan, but the view emerged from those interviewed for the research 
that this proposal was too late, too ambitious and never likely to secure the massive amount of 
development funding it would have required. Indeed, by unduly raising expectations, in terms of 
both value and product, ECD’s property-led regeneration proposal might well have impeded other 
less ambitious proposals coming forward. 
 
As the Nottingham case demonstrates, PLUR can be over-dependent on a particular constellation 
of circumstances enabling particular actors to challenge structural constraints at specific times. 
PLUR is indeed a high-risk business venture, especially when conducted at such a large scale. Its 
success often depends on the willingness of the public sector to absorb financial costs and risks 
without necessarily reaping eventual financial reward. In places like Nottingham Eastside, PLUR 
may well represent poor value for public money and a highly inefficient way to encourage major 
redevelopment.  
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Conclusions 
 
Some 27 years after much of Nottingham Eastside first fell vacant, its redevelopment potential 
remains unfulfilled. Of the ‘Critical Success Factors’ identified by Dixon et al. (2011), only three 
were actually present at Eastside, and then only partially. The scale of the site was certainly large, 
and arguably too large. While substantial monies were spent prioritising infrastructure that enabled 
some development to go ahead on the western edges, infrastructure provision and 
decontamination work has yet to start on the former railways land to the south. Although strong 
markets were experienced during the 2000s, by the time this was widely appreciated, it was too late 
to promote the Hopkins masterplan. Conversely, Eastside lacked strong partnerships, a strong 
brand and any real long-term vision, while land assembly, even in the recession, proved expensive 
not cheap. This suggests that ‘Critical Failure Factors’ are recognisable from the converse of those 
identified by Dixon et al. (2011). 
 
At Nottingham, these circumstances derived from the financial risk posed by three elements of 
the structural framework identified in the previous section. While the economic and property 
market cycles provided relatively short windows of opportunity within which development could 
take place, the particular locational and site-specific characteristics of the site demanded long-term 
commitment extending beyond a single development cycle. Ironically, the policy context offered 
no such commitment from the public sector, but instead assumed that the private sector would 
lead the development of the site over the long-term. At times, there was even no integrated 
commitment to the site over the short-term, as evident when Simons was encouraged by the 
council’s estates committee to pursue plans for car showrooms and a drive-thru restaurant on Site 
C, to which the planning committee then took exception. 
 
Specific risks consequently faced by private-sector developers included first, the cost and extent 
of decontamination, second, the means and timescale for recovery of any infrastructure 
expenditure, and third, the distinct possibility that development of any scale could not be 
completed and occupied before the next cyclical downturn. On Site A, the first two of these risks 
were reduced, but not eliminated, by public subsidy. Sites B and C received no public similar 
subsidy, and still remain to be treated for contamination and equipped with infrastructure. The 
cyclical nature of development generated the third risk, which proved to be the major reason why 
ECD was unable to finance the Hopkins masterplan. As the Nottingham experience demonstrates, 
when such risks are divided up between development actors, rather than shared among them, it 
becomes very difficult for any single actor to create that ‘breakthrough moment’ when a difficult 
structural context is challenge and transformed, enabling development to move ahead. 
 
In Nottingham, opportunities to transform a difficult structural context were missed, primarily as 
a result of uncoordinated actor behaviour. Property developers and investors came and went, four 
masterplans were produced but never really implemented, decontamination and infrastructure 
provision was partial and most of the land is still vacant after all these years. Perhaps most 
ironically, the City Council then sought to buy back, possibly by compulsory purchase, the very 
land it had sold to the private sector many years previously. None of this can be defended on 
grounds of economic efficiency, still less on those of social equity. As the Nottingham experience 
suggests, grandiose redevelopment proposals for secondary locations that require the mobilisation 
of very substantial private capital and/or public subsidy deserve widespread and critical scrutiny 
to interrogate their potential feasibility as much as their planning acceptability. 
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